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Overview
• Motivation
– problem of irrelevant alerts
• Alert verification
– verify success of attack
– passive and active mechanisms
• Prototype
– Snort extension
• Evaluation
• Conclusions
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Motivation
• Intrusion detection systems produce large amounts of alerts
• Often, administrators ignore these alerts because
– there are too many of them
– there are too many irrelevant ones
• Two main strategies to reduce alerts
1.  combine, summarize, and correlate alerts
2.  remove irrelevant alerts (or greatly reduce their priorities)
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Irrelevant Alerts
Irrelevant Alerts
• Alert classification
– Type 1 (true positive)
alert raised in response to successful attack
– Type 2 (non-relevant positive)
alert raised in response to actual attack that failed its objectives
– Type 3 (false positive)
alert raised in response to benign event
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Irrelevant Alerts
Non-relevant positive example
• Infected machine launches a Code Red attack against Apache 
web server (running on Linux host)
• Intrusion detection system (IDS) faithfully reports attack
Problem
• IDS reports an actual attack (cannot call it a false alarm)
• However, target host is not vulnerable (cannot call it a relevant attack)
• Even worse when web server is a Microsoft IIS, but it is patched
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Alert Verification
• Alert verification
– process of verifying the success of attacks
– allows IDS to distinguish between true positives (Type 1 alerts)
and non-relevant and false positives (Type 2 and Type 3 alerts)
– allows IDS to suppress an alert or reduce its priority
• Requirements
– accuracy
• the alert verification process should correctly tag all successful and 
unsuccessful alerts
• quality of input data
• timeliness of input data
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Alert Verification
• Requirements (cont.)
– low impact
• the verification process should not interfere with regular operations
– ease-of-use
• Classification
– according to verification technique
1.  context-based technique
2.  forensics-based technique
– according to point in time when verification data is gathered
1.  passive alert verification
2.  active alert verification
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Alert Verification Techniques
• Context-based verification
– model properties of networks and hosts
– model requirements of attacks (based on these properties)
– check whether an attack can possibly success, given a particular
network configuration
– example
• host operating system is a modeled property
• Code Red attack requires a Microsoft Windows target
• attacks against Linux hosts can be suppressed
– related work
• M2D2 [Morin, 2002]
• Real-time Network Awareness [Roesch, 2003]
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Alert Verification Techniques
• Forensics-based verification
– check for known outcome of attacks
– checkable and visible traces of attacks
– known outcome has to be defined for attacks similar to
misuse-based IDS signatures or virus signatures
– example
• worm is known to create a certain Windows Registry entry
– related work
• Cisco IDS [2004]
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Alert Verification Classification
• Passive alert verification
– gather context information once (or at regular intervals)
– information is available previously to attack
• Active alert verification
– gather context information or forensic data after alert is generated
– information is gathered in response to attack
– mechanisms can be divided into following groups
• active with remote access
• active with authenticated access
• active with dedicated sensor support
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Passive Alert Verification
• A priori information about
– host operating system, services and configuration, and
network topology
• Possibility to check
– if target host and service exist,
– if service is reachable, and
– if service is potentially vulnerable
+ basically no impact on network operations
+ can be managed at network level (no host support needed)
- database of network and hosts must be created and maintained
- information can be stale (i.e., out-of-date)
- limitations to the amount of information that can be gathered
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Active Alert Verification
With remote access
– a network connection to the target of the attack is needed
– allows active scanning in response to attack
• Information can be gathered about
– status and changes of services (using also passive information)
– actual vulnerabilities
• Vulnerability scanner
– checks remotely for vulnerabilities
– often ships with a large database of checks that can be performed
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Active Alert Verification
+ information is current
+ can be managed at network level (no host support needed)
+ large amount of checks already exist
- possible impact on network operations and services
• bandwidth consumption and service crashes
- vulnerability scanner is not completely accurate
• Vulnerability scanner can produce 
– false positives (no loss compared to IDS only)
– false negatives (problematic, but unlikely as a vulnerability scanner
performs a basic variation of corresponding attack)
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Active Alert Verification
With authenticated access
– verification process disposes of local (user) access to target host
– run scripts and system commands
• Information gathered about
– file integrity or existence of suspicious files
– system status about processes and network connections
+ current and accurate information 
+ basically no impact on network operations
- requires host support
- checks have to be developed
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Active Alert Verification
With dedicated sensor support
– verification process disposes of local (user) access to target host
– dedicated sensors are installed and configured
• Information gathered about
– kernel level events, system calls
+ current information
+ high-quality audit data 
+ basically no impact on network operations
- requires sensors to be installed and configured
- checks have to be developed
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Prototype
• Active alert verification prototype
– uses the remote access technique
– based on NASL scripts written for Nessus vulnerability scanner
– implemented as a patch to Snort IDS
• Nessus
– widely-used, open source vulnerability scanner
– many high quality checks available
– very modular and easy to integrate
– extensible NASL (Nessus Attack Scripting Language) language
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Prototype
• Snort patch
– extension of Snort’s alert processing pipeline
– intercepts alerts before being passed to output plug-ins
– multiple verification threads
• ensures high throughput if checks are waiting for time outs
• Selection of appropriate vulnerability check
– based on CVE ID
– both defined by Snort alerts and NASL scripts
– when no matching script is found, alert remains unverified and is simply
passed on
• All alerts are appropriately tagged and passed to output plug-ins
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Prototype
• Snort-AV prototype system
– no setup overhead
• as easy as setting up Snort
– covers a significant fraction of Snort alerts
– well maintained
• patch against latest Snort version 2.1.3
– reasonably popular
• about 5.000 downloads
– readily available
http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~wkr/projects/ids_alert_verification/
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Evaluation
• Synthetic benchmark
– Snort-AV on a test bed with an attacker and a victim host
– evaluation set consisting of 
1. nine working exploits against popular services such as Apache, bind,
sshd, sendmail, wu-ftpd
2. full scan using Nessus
– Snort generated 6,659 alerts, of which only 24 alerts were relevant
– among those 24 relevant alerts were all nine exploits
– all 24 relevant alerts were correctly verified, the rest was suppressed
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Evaluation
• Real world benchmark
– Snort-AV with two honeypots
• Snort-2.0.2
• Linux RedHat 7.2
• Windows 2000
– during a 14 days period
• 164.415 alerts in response to attacks against RedHat 7.2 
• 79.198 alerts in response to attacks against Windows 2000
– verification process results
• 161.166 attacks (98.3%) against RedHat 7.2 tagged as unsuccessful
• 78.785 attacks (99.4%) against Windows 2000 tagged as unsuccessful
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Evaluation
• Real world benchmark (cont.)
– most attacks were
• Slammer and Nachia worms
• scan activity against ports commonly used by web proxy and socks proxy
– unsuccessful attacks were manually checked
• possible because many attacks target non-existing services
– significant fraction of alerts were non-relevant positives
• despite the fact that an out-of-the-box Snort was used
• Limitations
– alert verification quality depends on quality of Nessus
– CVE ID sometimes imprecise
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Conclusions
• Real world systems produce a large amount of alerts
– in particular, non-relevant positives are a problem
• Alert verification is a process that determines the success of attacks to suppress
irrelevant alerts
• Classification
– context-based versus forensics-based techniques
– passive versus active verification techniques
• Snort-AV
– prototype of an active alert verification system with remote access 
– integrates the Nessus vulnerability scanner into the Snort IDS
– effective in synthetic and real world experiments
